This is the second philosophy paper I ever wrote. I present it to you unedited, it all it’s almost-understanding glory. So be nice. (My Professor was Dr. Christopher Grau at Florida International, he’s the most influential professors I’ve ever had). Fair warning, the views presented below do not necessarily reflect the views of The Acacian.

In this paper, I hope to compare and contrast the theories of J. S. Mill and I. Kant as they apply to when and if one should lie. In doing so I hope to illustrate how both utilitarianism and the categorical imperative theories work, and also to illustrate their problems. I will also attempt put forth a theory that does less to conflict with what feels moral to myself.

John Stuart Mill is a Utilitarian and his theory reflects that heavily. The Utilitarian theory is such that the act that promotes the most happiness (through pleasure) and lessens the most pain is the right one. All one’s decisions should be based on this principle. Or as Mill puts it “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals Utility, or the Greatest-happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (Mill- 283) He goes on to say that happiness is pleasure and a lack of pain, and that the reverse is the opposite. In his theory, Mill also states that some pleasures are better than others are. Many other Utilitarians feel that pleasure can only be measured quantitatively. Mill disagreed; he felt that pleasure could be measured qualitatively. He felt that some pleasures, namely intellectual ones, were better than others were. I find this difficult to relate this to lying, unless one would charge that the truth is a higher pleasure, which he does not. (Mill)

One of the strongest criticisms of Utilitarians hardly applies to the problem of lying. The criticism has to do with individual freedom and the worth of the individual. Many examples of this criticism involve the sacrifice of an unwilling individual to benefit the greater good. However, lying to a person to benefit the greater good does not carry that problem.

Immanuel Kant’s theory is much different from Mill’s theory. Kant uses the Categorical Imperative. He also states that “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim become universal law.” Kant tells of two kinds of imperatives a Hypothetical and a Categorical. The Hypothetical imperative takes the form “One should ________ if one wishes to _______.” For example: One should not steal if one wishes to not go to prison. On the other hand, in the case of a case of a Categorical Imperative, there is no “if one wishes to” one merely should. For example: One should not steal. Period. Regardless of the consequences, Kant feels that one should not steal. The same applies to lying. If every one lied all the time society could not function. The theory is that if everyone lied all the time lying itself would not function. Lying is only possible because most people tell the truth. It would seem that the fear was in the allowance of such an occurrence. If it is not wrong to lie, then it is possible, though not probable that everyone would lie all the time. The probability is irrelevant; the mere possibility is what makes lying always wrong. (Kant)

However, is lying always wrong? Some critics of Kant state examples of when it would not only be not immoral to lie, but that a person has moral responsibility to lie. For example, suppose an ax-murderer was stalking your wife. If he came to your house and demanded to know where she was, you certainly would not say “Oh, she’s in the bath. She’ll be out in five / ten minutes.” or “Yeah; she’s hiding behind that low shrub. You can see the bottom of her cornflower dress.” One would think that one would be perfectly justified in saying that she was not home but perhaps he should check at the police station. Kant, or a Kantian, would probably argue that you would only be justified in informing the ax-murderer that you are not going to tell them where your wife is. That would be still treating them with dignity. Kant says that all things fall into two groups; things with a price and things above price, those things with dignity. He elaborates to say that to treat a person as a means to an end is to treat them as less than a person, as if the did not have dignity and instead had a price. People should be treated with dignity, and to lie to any person is to put yourself above them by denying them the truth, and not even let them know that you’ve done so, and thereby robbing them of there dignity. I would say that an ax murderer does not deserve dignity, but Kant would disagree. In addition, I cannot disagree that one merely informing this one ax-murderer that one would not tell them where one’s wife is, would be just as effective as lying, and one does not have to lie. Therefore, I change my example: Suppose that instead of one ax-murderer, your wife is being stalked by a Viking horde of ax-murderers. Also suppose that you are under the distinct impression that if you informed them that you weren’t going to tell them where she was or tell them that she was in the house but that they couldn’t come in they would kill you, pillage and plunder your house and eventually find and kill your wife, anyways. In that case, I cannot see how you have any choice but to lie to the Viking horde of Ax-murderers. (Kant)

This would seem to be a tricky spot for many Kantians. Yet I think I have discovered a way around this problem. Kant condones capitol punishment because it does not have conflict with the Categorical Imperative. Some wonder how this can be. The Categorical Imperative seems to say that one should not kill. That is true. People should not kill other people all the time because they feel like it, because the world could not function if everyone killed other people all the time. Society, however, could function if everyone killed people that murdered innocent people all the time. Therefore, it seems that the Categorical Imperative has changed. When deciding if one should execute murderers, the question should be “Could society function if I made the killing of murderers universal law?” The answer is yes. The same applies to lying. One should not lie has become too vague. It is better to say one should not lie whenever one feels like it. I think that one can lie to protect the lives of others perhaps. That, however, does not take care of the problem of dignity. Still human life seems to have more value than dignity does. (Kant)

Under Mill’s Utilitarian doctrine, lying is allowed as long as it promotes the greater good. That is, if more good comes out of it than harm. However, is it ever moral to not lie when the greater good is not served? Is one justified in telling the truth if much pain will come from it, and, perhaps, the only perceivable good is that the person knows the truth, whereas otherwise they would have been lied to? Does one feel that some people deserve the truth, and that some deserve it more than others, at least from oneself? For example: If a husband is cheating on his wife, who is your friend. Should you tell her that her husband is cheating on her? You know that telling her that her husband is cheating on her will only make her very sad and angry, and that it may very likely break up their marriage. It would seem that no one will derive any pleasure from this, and it does not service the greater good. However, it also seems that she deserves the truth. So which is more important; truth or happiness? Which is the greater good?

In the example of the cheating husband, a utilitarian would say to lie to her. On the other hand, a Kantian would say that you cannot lie to her because she is a person and she deserves dignity. It seems that neither view is any better than the other is. In addition, depending on which one feels is more important, truth or pleasure, one would side with one view more often than another would.

Personally, I do not find either of the theories any more plausible than the other one. The theory of utility is very strait forward. It gives followers very simple rules to follow when deciding what one aught to do. Nevertheless, I feel that truth is just as important as pleasure, if not more so. Yet, Utilitarian theory is generally simple. To do whatever the thing is that will promote the most happiness may require some assumption, but it does not leave any room for the theory itself to be altered. In the Kantian theory that is not true. Since one applies the Categorical Imperative to many different circumstances, it is necessary to alter it quite frequently. This leads to the possibility for very specific actions in accordance with very specific circumstances. The danger there is that if one makes the specific situation that one is trying to apply to the Categorical Imperative too specific, it begins to look like utilitarianism. Because if all occasions where one aught to do something are circumstantial then one ceases to be acting out of duty. The Categorical Imperative ceases to be Categorical and becomes Hypothetical. Somehow, Kant’s theory will have become “One aught to ________, if one wishes to satisfy the ‘Categorical’ Imperative. In addition, I feel that there should be more to morality than trying to decide the rational possibility of everyone doing as I do. There are things that I think are immoral that the entire world could still function if everyone did them. Logically, if everyone beat their dogs, enslaved a specific race, or murdered everyone in a particular country, the world would still be able to function. I think that, perhaps, the Categorical Imperative could be a good starting point, with a few adjustments. Yet, I feel that there needs to be more criteria. (Kant,        Mill,       )

I wonder why it is necessary to concern oneself the sum total of everyone (As Utilitarians do.) It seems, to me, simpler, and more logical, to merely concern oneself with ‘sphere of influence.’ If one were to concern ones self with truth and the happiness of those people closest to oneself, which would seem to make the world more honorable. Moreover, honor is probably the best way to be moral. Honor is akin to loyalty and being true to something. Being loyal and true to the whole world seems to be an, all but, insurmountable task. To accomplish this loyalty to ones sphere of influence, one must create a hierarchy within which certain people’s needs are more important to oneself than others. It would also be necessary to place one’s own needs below the needs of those in one’s sphere of influence. An example of such a hierarchy would follow as such: One’s self would be in the center labeled group I, next would be group A which consists of one’s immediate family at the very top, then group B with one’s closest friends directly below group A, then below that Group C which consists of the rest of ones friends, plus the Groups A and B of the people in one’s own Group A, and the Group A of the people in one’s own Group B. The groups A through C are all above you, their needs are more important than yours are. Just below you is Group O, which consists of everyone else in the world, and below that, is group Z, which is your enemies, if you have any. An example of how this would work goes as follows: My parents are in Group A, and, to me, their needs are more important than my own. My friend Erik is in Group B, and, to me, his needs are more important than my own, but not more important than the needs of my parents. Then Erik’s parents are in Group C, and, to me, their needs are more important than my own, but not more important than the needs of my parents or of Erik. Also, to help prevent moral conflict within groups, one could implement an internal Utilitarian Principle. Of course, a criticism would be that this Hierarchy promotes isolationism, but that is not necessarily true, because of the linking of the different groups and the inclination for great size of Group C, the people of the world are all linked laterally in a web of personal relationships.

Works Cited

 Mill, John Stuart. “Utilitarianism” Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government. Rpt. In Philosophy: an Introduction Through Literature. Ed. Lowell Kleiman and Stephen Lewis. St. Paul: Paragon House, 1990. 280-294